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Abstract A neuropsychological perspective on auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH)
links key phenomenological features of the experience, such as voice location and
identity, to functionally separable pathways in normal human audition. Although this
auditory processing stream (APS) framework has proven valuable for integrating
research on phenomenology with cognitive and neural accounts of hallucinatory
experiences, it has not yet been applied to other symptoms presumed to be closely
related to AVH – such as thought insertion (TI). In this paper, I propose that an APS
framework offers a useful way of thinking about the experience of TI as well as AVH,
providing a common conceptual framework for both. I argue that previous self-
monitoring theories struggle to account for both the differences and similarities in the
characteristic features of AVH and TI, which can be readily accommodated within an
APS framework. Furthermore, the APS framework can be integrated with predictive
processing accounts of psychotic symptoms; makes predictions about potential sites of
prediction error signals; and may offer a template for understanding a range of other
symptoms beyond AVH and TI.
1 Introduction
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) and the experience of thought insertion (TI) are
commonly discussed together as characteristic or ‘first-rank’ symptoms (FRS) of
schizophrenia (Schneider 1959; see Table 1). However, it is increasingly clear that
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these symptoms also occur in a range of other disorders and in the general population
(Beavan et al. 2011; Nordgaard et al. 2008; Nuevo et al. 2013; Rössler et al. 2007).
Such findings have contributed to a renewal of interest in dimensional ways of thinking
about psychopathology (Insel et al. 2010), which start with the assumption that
symptoms – such as AVH and TI – arise from disturbances in basic psychological
and physiological mechanisms underpinning human behaviour (Badcock et al. 2014;
Ford et al. 2014). It has previously been proposed that some of the characteristic
features of AVH (such as the identity and location of hallucinated voices1) can be
grounded in the mechanisms of human voice perception; specifically, the abnormal
activation of parallel auditory pathways underlying the identification (‘what’) and
localization (where) of sounds (Badcock 2010). The evidence regarding the differential
properties of separable auditory processing streams has provided a valuable ‘frame-
work’, i.e., a broad approach, for thinking about AVH (Wilkinson 2014). However, it
has not previously been extended to other closely related symptoms, such as TI - yet
inserted thoughts are traditionally viewed as being phenomenologically and causally
related to AVH (Humpston and Broome 2015; Nelson et al. 2014). In this paper, I aim
to show that an auditory processing streams (APS) framework may help us to under-
stand the experience of TI as well as AVH, providing a common conceptual framework
for both. Specifically, I suggest that a neuropsychological approach to psychotic
symptoms, based on parallel auditory pathways, can help us to understand both the
similarities and differences in the characteristic features of TI and AVH. I also suggest
the APS framework can be united with predictive coding accounts of hallucinations and
delusions (Adams et al. 2013; Fletcher and Frith 2009), providing the basis for a more
integrated model of these symptoms.
To illustrate these ideas I begin with a brief description of the similarities and
differences in phenomenology and epidemiology of AVH and TI and critique how
alternative explanations based on Forward Models fare in accounting for these charac-
teristics. I then introduce the APS framework, explore the characteristic features of
AVH and TI in terms of the functional division of auditory processing streams, and
conclude by outlining the implications and challenges for future research.
1.1 Similarities and Differences in the Phenomenology of AVH and TI
At the individual level of analysis, both AVH and TI are experienced as intrusions that
interrupt ongoing thoughts and events. People with these symptoms describe a sense of
passivity about their experiences - Bthey come unasked^ (Jaspers 1963, p. 123), along
with a diminished sense of control that helps distinguish these experiences from
ordinary verbal thought (Hoffman et al. 2008; see Table 1). Furthermore, in the
majority of cases both AVH and TI are experienced as intrusions generated by an
external identity; that is, they are perceived as a voice or a thought which is not
regarded as one’s own, but seems to belong to someone else (though Bown voice^
hallucinations also occur; e.g., Corstens and Longden 2013). Despite these phenome-
nological similarities AVH and TI also differ in important ways. Most notably, AVH are
typically described as having a range of auditory sensory qualities (e.g., voices varying
1 For brevity, I use voices (in italics) to refer the perception of voices in the absence of external stimulation and
AVH to refer to all forms of auditory verbal hallucinations.
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in loudness, tone and clarity; McCarthy-Jones et al. 2014) which inserted thoughts
usually lack. However, when examining first-person reports it is also clear that at least
some hallucinated voices are described as Bsoundless^ or Binaudible^, while some
inserted thoughts are cast as internal voices (Woods et al. 2014). Therefore, the
supposed distinction in auditory-sensory quality between AVH and TI gives way to a
degree of overlap in audibility (Humpston and Broome 2015). A further difference
arises in terms of the location and manner in which these symptoms are experienced. In
particular, people with TI believe that Bsomebody is putting thoughts into my head^
(emphasis added; Wilkinson 2014) – that is, the experience is located internally or at
least arriving in personal space. In contrast, it has long been recognized that people with
AVH report hearing voices both inside and outside the head. Indeed, a recent phenom-
enological survey of 199 psychiatric patients showed that the location of AVH was
equally likely to be reported in internal or external space, or both, during the last
episode (McCarthy-Jones et al. 2014). It is clear, therefore, that a common neuropsy-
chological framework which aims to account for both AVH and TI must be able to
accommodate both the overlap and the differences between these experiences.
1.2 Similarities and Differences in the Epidemiology of AVH and TI in Psychosis
At the population level, epidemiological data reveal both differences (in prevalence)
and similarities (or co-occurrence) in AVH and TI that also points to the presence of
Table 1 Definitions and examples of thought insertion and auditory verbal hallucinations
Definition Example questions Example descriptions (self-reports)
Thought insertion
The subject experiences thoughts
which are not his own intruding
into his mind. The symptom is
not that he has been caused to
have unusual thoughts, but that
the thoughts themselves are not
his. [Wing et al., 1983].
Do there ever seem to be thoughts
in your mind which are not your
own; which seem to come from
elsewhere? [DIP 20.49; SCAN
18.006]
Do you ever feel as if the thoughts
in your head are not your own?
[CAPE #26].
BOften, in a quiet place, and all the
time at night when I am alone, I
experience thoughts that do not
Bfeel^ like my own. It’s like
they come out of a part of my
brain that is not the part that
controls my Bnormal^ thoughts
and into my awareness from




A sensory experience which occurs
in the absence of corresponding
external stimulation of the
relevant sensory organ; has a
sufficient sense of reality to
resemble a veridical perception,
over which the subject does not
feel s/he has direct voluntary
control and which occurs in the
awake state. [David, 2004]
Have you ever heard noises or
voices when there is nobody
about and no ordinary
explanation seems possible?
[SCAN 17.001)
Do you ever hear voices talking to
each other rather than to you?
[DIP 20.48; SCAN 17.009]
Do you ever hear voices talking to
each other when you are alone?
[CAPE #34]
BYou have to kill yourself^
[‘Anna Peter’ on
intervoiceonline*]
BIsn’t he stupid, he never gets
anything right^
DIP diagnostic interview for psychosis, SCAN Schedules for clinical assessment in neuropsychiatry, CAPE
community assessment of psychic experience. CIDI composite international diagnostic interview *http://www.
crazyboards.org/forums/index.php/topic/37139-thought-insertion/?hl=alienonite#entry401745 * *http://www.
intervoiceonline.org/about-voices
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some separate, and some shared functional mechanisms. For example, in a now classic
study in the field, Sartorius and colleagues found that approximately 70 % of patients
with schizophrenia reported AVH on the Present State Examination, whilst only 25–
42 % experienced TI, with variation depending on the country of origin (Sartorius et al.
1986; see also Shinn et al. 2012). More recent data drawn from the Survey of High
Impact Psychosis, 2010 (SHIP; Morgan, personal communication; see Table 2), which
is based on a representative sample of patients in public treatment services in Australia
(Morgan et al. 2012, 2014), shows a similar discrepancy in prevalence between TI and
AVH, regardless of the specific diagnostic category assessed. Confidence in these
differences relies on the psychometric properties of the assessments used, the inter-
viewers’ skills to elicit and judge symptoms, and the ability of individual patients to talk
about their experiences. With these limitations in mind, these data seem to indicate that
hallucinated voices are much more common than inserted thoughts, which suggests that
their underlying mechanisms differ.
Conversely, AVH and TI often co-occur, which tends to imply that their
underlying mechanisms overlap. Although, factor analytic methods have often
been employed to examine how symptoms aggregate, the best level of analysis
to capture symptom-mechanism links is still unknown. Thus, AVH and TI are
often considered together, in a ‘positive symptoms’ factor (e.g., Ventura et al.
2010), but sometimes considered apart (i.e., in separate factors; e.g., Heering
et al. 2013), consistent with shared or distinct functional processes, respectively.
Capturing this complexity, Peralta and Cuesta proposed a hierarchical structure
for psychotic symptoms. At the first level of their analysis they identified 13
inter-correlated primary factors. However, a further factor analysis of these first-
order factors yielded five uncorrelated Bhigher-order^ factors, which accounted
for most of the symptom covariance (63.5 %) (Peralta et al. 2013). Importantly,
in this hierarchical model, TI retained higher loading as a first-order factor
whilst AVH formed a higher-order factor, which suggests the experience of
hearing voices indexes a more general set of features (and corresponding set of
mechanisms) whilst TI is more specific. Of course, symptom co-occurrence can
sometimes be determined from phenomenological or epidemiological survey
data as well – though is often lost through symptom pooling. For example,
Nayani and David (1996) observed that 39 % of patients with AVH also
reported TI, whilst more recent data from the SHIP (Morgan et al. 2012) shows
that the risk of TI is increased over 6-fold among those with AVH, relative to
those without (present state OR=6.65, 95 % CI: 4.94 – 8.97; lifetime OR=
3.17, 95 % CI: 2.50 – 4.01) (see supplementary Table 1). Overall, the challenge
that emerges from this data is whether a common conceptual framework can
explain why the experience of hearing voices is more common than, yet
increases the risk for, TI in psychosis.
1.3 Similarities and Differences in the Epidemiology of AVH and TI in the General
Population
The literature discussed so far relates to the expression of AVH and TI after illness
onset. However, recent studies suggest that the dynamic co-occurrence of hallucina-
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to psychosis (Nuevo et al. 2013; Smeets et al. 2013). The experience of AVH in non-
clinical samples is now well-recognized and intensively studied. For example, popula-
tion based studies have shown that hallucinated voices are relatively common during
childhood and the early teenage years, reported in 21–23 % of individuals. The
majority of these symptoms appear to be transitory, with prevalence in older adoles-
cents falling to around 7 % (Preti et al. 2014), and may simply reflect normal
fluctuations in cognitive development (Badcock and Hugdahl 2014; Kelleher et al.
2012). However, for some, hallucinations persist and carry an increased risk of
transitioning to a range of psychopathologies (Fusar-Poli et al. 2013). In
comparison, TI-like experiences in non-clinical groups have been given much
less attention. Nonetheless, studies using self-report measures suggest that TI
also occurs in the general community including, but not exclusive to, young
adults at ultra-high risk for psychosis (Fonseca-Pedrero et al. 2012; Mossaheb
et al. 2012; Wiles et al. 2006). For example, Mossaheb and colleagues found
that approximately 43 % of ultra-high risk subjects reported the presence of TI
on the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences questionnaire (see
Table 1), compared to around 37 % of those assessed as not at risk
(Mossaheb, personal communication), whilst Rössler and colleagues reported
the four-week prevalence rate of TI (defined as Bhaving thoughts that are not
your own^) in 20–21 year olds from the general community was 22.6 %,
compared to 3.2 % for auditory hallucinations (Rössler et al. 2007). These data
appear to indicate some important age-related differences in the experience of
AVH and TI in the general community, which merit further attention in
longitudinal studies. Of course, another possibility is that positive endorsement
of TI or AVH in these studies reflects a qualitatively different kind of experi-
ence than in psychosis, though this concern is partly mitigated by cross-
validation of self-report tools with interview-based measures (e.g., Konings
et al. 2006; Mossaheb et al. 2012). On the other hand, the evidence seems to
show that healthy individuals with hallucinations are at significantly greater risk
of delusions than those without, with TI much more likely to co-occur with
AVH than other types of delusion, (i.e., this specific combination of symptoms
is unlikely to be simply a random event). Indeed, Smeets and colleagues
proposed that this particular confluence of symptoms could represent a critical
phase in the earliest stages of transition to psychosis (Smeets et al. 2013). If
correct, this implies that the dynamic co-occurrence of AVH and TI is not
simply a general marker of illness severity, but a specific index of the likeli-
hood of illness progression. In turn, this would also suggest that impairments in
the underlying neuropsychological mechanisms common to AVH and TI play a
key role in the transition to psychosis.
To summarize, a direct comparison of hallucinated voices and inserted thoughts
reminds us that they share some characteristic features (e.g., a sense of diminished
control and intrusion of external identity), but also differ in others (e.g., in perceived
location). The evidence also suggests that hallucinated voices are more common than,
though strongly associated with, inserted thoughts, and together they may play an
important role in the development of psychosis. Overall, these differences and similar-
ities suggest there may be partial, but not complete, overlap in the underlying mech-
anisms of AVH and TI – which I turn to next.
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2 The Forward Model Framework
The most influential neurocognitive account of AVH and TI suggests these symptoms
result from a dysfunctional self-monitoring mechanism. Ordinarily, it is assumed, the
process of self-monitoring allows us to distinguish between self-generated and
externally-generated stimuli. At the neural level, self-monitoring has been linked to a
‘forward model’ which allows us to compare the predicted and observed outcomes of a
movement. If these match, then we can assume the movement was self-generated.
According to this account, first rank symptoms of schizophrenia occur when this
comparator mechanism is dysfunctional, leading self-generated stimuli to be experi-
enced as arising from an external cause (Feinberg 1978; Frith 1992). In the case of
AVH and TI, what has been proposed is that both of these symptoms could be
explained in terms of a failure to properly monitor the movement entailed in the
production of inner speech, which is then misattributed to an external source (Jones
and Fernyhough 2007). However, this explanation has been subject to a number of
criticisms (see e.g., Waters et al. 2006; Wilkinson 2014). These problems are best
illustrated here by thinking about the similarities and differences in these symptoms
described above. For example, if aberrant monitoring of one’s own inner speech
accounts for the misattribution to an external identity in AVH and TI then why do
many people report experiencing the voice or thoughts of someone else, i.e., another
specific person (e.g., the thoughts of a man called Pete, or the voice of a past abuser).
How does this ‘transformation’ occur? Furthermore, if misattribution results from an
abnormality in self-monitoring then what additional mechanism accounts for the sense
of diminished control common to AVH and TI? On the other hand, if we treat both
AVH and TI as the result of a single mechanism involving misattributed inner speech
then how do we explain their differences in perceived location and prevalence, for
example? In sum, self-monitoring theory falls short as an adequate account of the
characteristic features of AVH and TI.
Since its initial description, the comparator model has been elaborated and refined,
with attention now focused on the computations involved in predicting all (rather than
just self-produced) stimuli, within a Bpredictive processing framework^ (PPF; Clark
2013; Frith 2012).2 In the PPF, a prediction is a prior expectation (of the state of the
world) based on stored knowledge, which is used to construct the incoming sensory
signal ‘from the top down’, whilst sensory feedback provides the basis on which the
prior should be updated. Within these more integrated forward models the emphasis is
on precision and minimization of prediction error signals – Bthe deviation between the
state one expects to experience and what is actually experienced^ (Griffiths et al. 2014,
p. 439) - which have long been considered critical for normal cognition. This interest is
now being matched by growing speculation that abnormal prediction coding is impli-
cated in the positive symptoms of psychosis (Adams et al. 2013; Fletcher and Frith
2009; Griffiths et al. 2014). Wilkinson (2014), for example, has argued that a PPF can
account for auditory hallucinations based on external stimuli (e.g., hypervigilance
hallucinations, Dodgson and Gordon 2009), as well as internal stimuli (such as inner
speech). For the latter, Wilkinson suggests that the distinct auditory phenomenology of
2 From this perspective, the inner speech/self-monitoring account of AVH represents a special case of
predictive coding which allows us to predict the sensory consequences of our own actions.
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AVH arises from imprecise predictions (in speech processing areas) about the acoustic
consequences of inner speech, which results in a misperception that someone else is
speaking. Similarly, if hallucinations are considered to arise from a reduction in the
precision of priors (which are based on stored knowledge) then a PPF can also be
united with the idea that AVH involve a failure to suppress memories that are irrelevant
to ongoing events (Badcock and Hugdahl 2012; Badcock et al. 2005). In general,
however, the current line of thinking is that AVH (and therefore potentially TI as well)
may arise from an imbalance between perceptual expectations (i.e., heightened predic-
tions) and actual sensory input, related to deficiencies in processing prediction error
(Friston 2005; Nazimek et al. 2012). Moreover, abnormal prediction error signaling is
likely to contribute to deficiencies in associative learning (e.g., learning to distinguish
between predictive and non-predictive/irrelevant cues) and the formation of maladap-
tive beliefs in individuals with these symptoms, consistent with previous evidence
(Corlett and Fletcher 2015; Morris et al. 2013). Nonetheless, a number of challenges
remain with predictive coding accounts of psychotic symptoms in general, and of AVH
and TI in particular. For example, there needs to be some account of why specific
symptoms differ from one person to another (Frith 2012) or, indeed, why TI and AVH
differ at all. If (some) hallucinated voices and all inserted thoughts arise from imprecise
predictions of inner speech then how do we account for their differences in auditory
phenomenology (the gradient in auditory sensory qualities and distinction in perceived
location), and why are TI rarer? Others have argued that a Bmere failure of prediction is
not sufficient to generate a delusion^ (p. 53, Frith 2012) - a belief that an unusual
sensory experience is real (see Coltheart et al. 2011; Griffiths et al. 2014). If prediction
errors signal the intrusion of perceptual anomalies or the onset of intrusive thoughts
(i.e., the content of AVH and TI) then a second mechanism is required to explain why
the experience is believed to be real – a point which I will return to later. Alternatively,
it’s possible to think of prediction error signals being implemented at successively
higher levels of the cortical hierarchy (i.e., a single core abnormality; Fletcher and Frith
2009), but the level or site in the cortical hierarchy that is relevant to specific symptoms
(such as AVH and TI) remains underspecified. I suggest this limitation might be (partly)
addressed by embedding predictive coding mechanisms within an APS framework.
3 An Auditory Processing Stream Framework
If AVH and TI have their origins in normal cognitive and neural mechanisms, then our
explanations of how they arise need to be grounded in the best available models of
human perception and cognition. AVH, for example, are usually conceived as the
abnormal perception of voices; consequently current models of voice perception
provide a useful overarching framework for understanding both the intra-(cognitive
and neural) and inter-(social) individual mechanisms driving the onset and diversity of
hallucinated voices in psychotic and non-psychotic groups (Badcock 2010; Badcock
et al. 2014). Accordingly, the perception of voice has been shown to entail more than
just speech/language; it involves a wealth of socially important information about the
identity, affect and location of a speaker (Belin et al. 2011). Emerging evidence
indicates that these different types of input are processed in voice-sensitive regions of
auditory cortex – the Btemporal voice areas^ - and thereafter in parallel, and
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hierarchically organized, ventral (anterior superior temporal to inferior frontal) and
dorsal (posterior superior temporal, inferior parietal, and superior frontal) processing
streams. These pathways subserve the two main functions of hearing, identification
(sound-to-meaning mapping) and localization (sound-to-motor mapping) and represent
two separate sources of forward prediction (Alho et al. 2014; Belin et al. 2011; Hickok
2012; Latinus and Belin 2011; Leavitt et al. 2011; Rauschecker 2011). Typically, the
input in these pathways is seamlessly integrated into memory, as a coherent perceptual
whole; however, their segregated nature means that each kind of vocal information
(words, identity, location, etc.) can be disturbed somewhat independently of the others.
Importantly, empirical evidence suggests that the phenomenological diversity of AVH
(e.g., identity of voices and their localization in space) can be understood (at least in
part) in terms of the specific pattern of dysfunction, at different hierarchical levels,
within and between these auditory processing streams (Badcock 2010; Badcock and
Chhabra 2013; Chen et al. 2013; Looijestijn et al. 2013). Accordingly, the similarities
and differences in AVH and TI noted above, could be conceived as emerging as a result
of partial, but not complete, overlap of dysfunction in these auditory processing streams
– as shown in simplified form in Table 3. The following sections will elaborate on this
idea.
3.1 Abnormal Activation of Auditory Processing Streams: Intrusions
and Diminished Control
The fundamental premise of the APS framework is that dysfunctional activation of
auditory processing streams co-opts the same neural resources used to process Breal^
external stimuli, which intrudes into ongoing mental events and becomes confused
with reality. This general formulation can readily account for the shared sense of
passivity in AVH and TI (see section 1.1). It can also account for experimental evidence
of an increase in intrusive cognitions in people with AVH and TI, both in the presence
(Brebion et al. 2010; Brebion et al. 2012; see also Marzillier and Steel 2007) and the
absence of a specific task (Lobban et al. 2002; Morrison and Baker 2000). For example,
both healthy individuals prone to hearing voices and patients with ‘thought interfer-
ence’ (e.g., thought insertion) have higher scores on self-report measures of intrusive
thoughts in daily life (e.g., There are thoughts that keep jumping into my head)
compared to controls (Linney and Peters 2007; Smailes et al. 2015; Varese et al.
2010; Vellante et al. 2012).
Table 3 A multi-dimensional approach to AVH and TI based on auditory perception
Spatial Location (Dorsal) Identity (Ventral)
Self Other
Internal location Perception of voice Thought insertion
AVH (inside the head)
External location Gedankenlautwerden AVH (outside the head)
‘Own thought AVH’
Thought broadcast
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Although intrusions are a central feature of AVH and TI, the underlying causes of
abnormal activation in auditory pathways are still a matter of debate. Some have
proposed, for example, that AVH begins with aberrant cortical activity in the medial
temporal lobe and then propagates to temporal and parietal auditory streams, making
the experience sensory (Jardri et al. 2011). Alternatively, AVH and TI seem to involve a
tendency to mentally wander away (e.g., from the task at hand) and wander towards
something else (e.g., a personal concern) which may point to a disturbance in the
brain’s default mode network (DMN; Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford 2012) – a major
neural correlate of stimulus independent thought (Christoff 2012; Mason et al. 2007).
Consistent with this proposal, hyper-activation of associative sensory (e.g., auditory)
cortex has been shown to occur when the DMN is disengaged and correlates with the
severity of hallucinations (Jardri et al. 2013). Empirical studies of TI and DMN are still
missing; however, an intriguing possibility is that the similar tendency to intrusive
cognitions reflects spontaneous engagement (intrusive thoughts/mind wandering) and
withdrawal (AVH/TI) from DMN activity, respectively (Gerrans 2013).
Dysfunctional activation of auditory pathways can also be considered from a PPF
perspective. Horga and colleagues, for example, examined sensory prediction errors in
schizophrenia patients with daily AVH (Horga et al. 2014). They manipulated partic-
ipants’ expectation of hearing speech by varying the probability of speech stimuli in a
speech decision-making task. Functional imaging showed that patients activated a
voice-sensitive region in auditory cortex when hearing voices, which was associated
with deficient prediction error signals in the same region. In addition, this prediction
error deficit was strongly associated with increased cortical activity during silence. The
authors therefore concluded that deficient predictive coding could account for hyper-
activity in auditory cortex that leads to AVH (Horga et al. 2014). Could deficient
predictive coding also apply to TI? The results of Horga’s study showed that the
magnitude of the predictive coding deficit was associated with the severity of AVH,
but not other psychotic symptoms. So it’s possible that the PPF can account for
hallucinations but not inserted thoughts - though this runs counter to the proposal that
aberrant predictive coding underlies all positive psychotic symptoms (Fletcher and
Frith 2009). Alternatively, given the specific response properties of voice-sensitive
cortex, predictive coding errors in this particular region may result in the auditory-
sensory quality of ‘hearing’ a voice, which usually differs (i.e., is typically absent) in TI
(see Section 1.1). This proposal could be tested by employing the same decision-
making task to determine if deficient predictive coding in this region is associated with
TI cast as Bvoices^ but not with AVH described as Bsoundless^.
It is important to remember that intrusive cognitions are usually met by a response in
the central executive network in an attempt to reinstate control and coordinate thoughts
and actions (Niendam et al. 2012). Both the tendency to intrusions and diminished
sense of control shared by people with AVH and TI (see Table 1) suggests a common
impairment in the ability to control and regulate mental representations - be they
individual features of auditory stimuli (words, voice, identity etc.) or entire episodes
in memory. Consistent with this proposal, there is mounting evidence that the presence
and persistence of AVH, in psychotic and non-psychotic voice hearers, is associated
with deficits in cognitive inhibition (reviewed in Badcock and Hugdahl 2014; El Haj
et al. 2015). For example, on repeated runs of a continuous recognition task (all
composed of the same set of pictures) schizophrenia patients with current AVH produce
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significantly more incorrect responses to distractors (false alarms) seen on previous
runs than non-hallucinating patients, indicating an inability to suppress recently acti-
vated but currently irrelevant memories (Badcock et al. 2005). Correct performance on
this task requires the ability to judge whether a currently active representation (a
memory/thought) pertains to present reality, or not, and involves the rapid activation
of posterior orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), leading Schnider and colleagues to refer to this
mechanism as ‘orbitofrontal reality filtering’ (Liverani et al. 2015; Schnider 2013).3
Conversely, impairment of this mechanism allows irrelevant representations (memo-
ries, thoughts) to intrude into current events and be treated (believed) as real4 (Badcock
et al. 2005; Waters et al. 2003) and could therefore provide a common functional
component of TI as well as AVH (Vosgerau and Voss 2014). This prediction could
easily be tested by examining the performance of patients and healthy individuals with
inserted thoughts on various measures of executive/inhibitory control. However, it is
important to note that an impairment in this capacity alone is not sufficient to generate
hallucinations or inserted thoughts. Crucially, patients with lesions to the OFC or with
intrusive, obsessional thoughts, exhibit significantly impaired performance on measures
of inhibitory control, in the absence of either AVH or TI (Badcock et al. 2007; Schnider
and Ptak 1999). This adds further weight to the view that the phenomenological
complexity of psychotic symptoms cannot be explained on the basis of a single
mechanism alone (Ford et al. 2014; Vosgerau and Voss 2014).
In sum, the similarities in AVH and TI related to intrusion and control can be easily
understood within an APS framework, which unites a range of behavioural and neural
evidence on these symptoms. Furthermore, predictive coding accounts can be embed-
ded into this framework leading to testable predictions about the role of basic voice
processing mechanisms in the auditory-sensory quality of AVH and TI. By extension,
the functional specialization of dorsal (where) and ventral (what) streams may help us
to understand some of the other characteristic features of AVH and TI described in
Section 1.
3.2 Abnormal Activation of the Ventral Processing Stream: Perceiving Speaker
Identity
One of the most challenging features to explain about AVH or TI is why inserted
thoughts and voices are often attributed to somebody else (an identity other than the
self; see Table 3 –columns). Indeed, this aspect of the phenomenology is particularly
difficult to reconcile with the dominant comparator account of either experience, which
assumes that AVH or TI are misattributed inner speech: since if this model was correct
the identity of the inserted thought or voicemight be expected to be similar to the self in
some fundamental ways. However, this expectation is mostly unmet. In fact, inserted
thoughts and voices are often perceived or attributed to a different age/gender, individ-
ual (known or unknown), or entity with malevolent or benevolent intent (Spirits, the
Devil, the government; for a review, see Badcock and Chhabra 2013). For example,
B..out of nowhere I heard this woman’s voice in my head whisper to me. She was
3 Indeed, recent electrophysiological evidence suggests this capacity can dissociated from the ability to know
which episode in the past a memory refers to (Liverani et al. 2015).
4 Note – this may equate to saying that AVH and TI do not Bfeel^ like memories.
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talking really, really fast, then it was more women talking. I looked everywhere
thinking it was maybe the radio? But no, it followed me to the train.^ (Angie 2013),
or BThoughts are put into my mind like ‘kill God’. It’s just like my mind working, but it
isn’t. They come from this chap, Chris. They’re his thoughts.^ (Frith 1992, p 66).
Indeed, a recent data synthesis of 100 clinical voice-hearers reported that representa-
tions of voice identity (e.g., a family member) could be formulated in 78 % of cases
(Corstens and Longden 2013). Furthermore, previous evidence suggests that a recog-
nizably non-self speaking voice is a key feature used to differentiate voices from one’s
own thoughts, more so than other auditory qualities such as loudness or clarity
(Hoffman et al. 2008). Interestingly, however, despite the increased risk of TI in people
with AVH, there seem to be no previous studies that have provided a detailed
phenomenological comparison of attributed identity in AVH and TI. For example,
patients with schizophrenia hear voices of both genders but there is a preponderance of
adult male voices (Corstens and Longden 2013; McCarthy-Jones et al. 2014). Future
studies of TI should therefore investigate whether the identity of inserted thoughts is
also attributed more often to males than females.
Perhaps perceptions and beliefs about the identity of inserted thoughts or voices are
meaningless, reflecting idiosyncratic language use related to thought disorder.
However, this explanation seems unlikely since these experiences are often reported
even when disorganized thinking is not present. Alternatively, assigning names to AVH
may reflect a secondary cognitive strategy, rather than an integral part of voice-hearing,
simply to keep track of multiple voices. However, the ability to assign a separate name
seems to rest on the lived experience that the identity of hallucinated voices can, in
some way, be distinguished (e.g., the older, dominant male voice is called ‘the Judge’)
as particular, significant agents.5 Furthermore, judgments about the physical and social
identity (age/gender, dominance/trustworthiness) of voices are directly related to the
relationship and amount of distress that occurs with AVH (Beavan 2011). The link
between identity and distress does not seem to have been examined in relation to TI,
but the association in AVH suggests that this aspect of the experience cannot simply be
dismissed as irrelevant. Rather, assignment of a name/identity in AVH and TI is likely
to be psychologically meaningful, tied to each individuals life’s history and manner of
relating to others (Corstens and Longden 2013; Paulik 2012),6 and grounded in the
basic neural resources involved in the perception and recognition of speaker identity
(Badcock and Chhabra 2013).
Our understanding of how the brain recognizes ‘who’ is speaking has improved
greatly in recent years (reviewed in: Mathias and von Kriegstein 2014; Schweinberger
et al. 2014). For example, in the model proposed by Belin, the analysis of vocal identity
occurs in a series of hierarchical stages beginning with the acoustical processing of
voices, regardless of familiarity, in the temporal voice areas of the ventral auditory
stream. This is followed by processing in modality-dependent voice recognition units,
in anterior regions of superior temporal sulcus (STS), which feeds into supramodal
‘person identity nodes’ whereby access to biographical information (such as names)
may be gained (Belin et al. 2011; Bethmann and Brechmann 2014). Thus normal
5 For a more detailed discussion of the function of proper names, see Jeshion (2009).
6 Note, this means that the names/identities reported in AVH and TI need not be limited to individuals who
have been directly perceived or interacted with in the past.
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processing of voices involves increasingly more abstract representations of speaker
identity, independent of other (e.g., acoustic) features (Warren et al. 2006). Current
evidence also suggests that individual voices are coded relative to how different they
are from a prototypical, or average, voice (i.e., a ‘prior’; Andics et al. 2013; Andics
et al. 2010; Latinus et al. 2013), which indicates that both prediction and prediction
error signals are routinely implemented in the perception of speaker identity.
Given the salient attributions of identity in many AVH and TI, it seems likely that
both these symptoms would engage the ventral auditory pathway (for evidence on AVH
see: Allen et al. 2012; Badcock 2010; Diederen et al. 2012). Specifically, it might be
expected that abnormal activation at lower levels in the hierarchy would be associated
with the intrusion of an unfamiliar voice/external identity, whilst the intrusion of a
familiar voice (e.g., the voice of past abuser) or personified thought (e.g., from a man
called ‘Chris’) may be associated with dysfunctional activation at increasingly higher
levels of the ventral hierarchy. To date, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on voice
perception mechanisms in TI. However, there are a growing number of behavioural and
neurobiological studies showing impairments in the perception and recognition of
voices in clinical and non-clinical voice hearers, which suggests that the underlying
pathway is dysfunctional (Alba-Ferrara et al. 2012; Badcock and Chhabra 2013). Mou
et al. (2013), for instance, used a voice recognition task in a functional imaging
paradigm and showed that patients hearing voices (compared to those who do not)
had reduced connectivity in frontotemporal networks involved in voice identification.
However, since their patients were matched on the presence of delusions, the authors
also concluded that faulty appraisal of voice identity was specific to AVH (Mou et al.
2013). But the small sample sizes in this study (N=13 per group) tempers these
conclusions, and leaves open the possibility that alterations in functional connectivity
of the auditory ventral pathway occur in TI as well as AVH (Alba-Ferrara et al. 2012;
Chhabra et al. 2012a). Another possibility is that impaired precision of encoding of
basic acoustic cues (Chhabra et al. 2012b; 2014; see also: Javitt 2009) generates
prediction error signals that propagate to increasingly higher levels of the ventral
processing stream.
In short, the APS framework offers a new way of thinking about the sense of
external identity in AVH and TI, based on well-established mechanisms for human
voice perception. The remainder of this section will consider whether the different
spatial attributes of these symptoms can be accommodated in this framework as well
(see Table 3 – rows).
3.3 Abnormal Activation of the Dorsal Processing Stream: Perceiving Spatial
Location
First person accounts of TI describe experiences that are located inside the head (i.e., in
personal/internal space) or have been put into the head (implying a trajectory in space)
from elsewhere.7 In contrast, hallucinated voices are typically reported as arising from a
fixed location in internal or external (extracorporeal) space. Indeed, recent surveys
suggest that the location of AVH is about equally likely to be internal or external in
7 Humpston and Broome (2015) describe TI as: Ban experience of someone or something else’s thoughts
penetrating into one’s head from the external^ (p.7; emphasis added).
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clinical and non-clinical voice-hearers (Daalman et al. 2011; McCarthy-Jones et al.
2014), consistent with the view that the perceived location of voices may have limited
diagnostic utility in patients with psychosis (Longden et al. 2012). Of course, it’s
possible that the self-reported localization of these symptoms is simply unreliable.
For example, there are conflicting reports of a tendency towards externalization,
internalization, or stability of voice location over time (McCarthy-Jones et al. 2014;
Nayani and David 1996; Plaze et al. 2011). However, if this explanation is correct, it’s
far from clear why the subjective location of inserted thoughts is not equally inconstant.
Alternatively, the lived experience of AVH and TI in internal or external space might be
an accurate representation of the perceptual experience, grounded in atypical activation
of mechanisms for spatial localization (Fisher et al. 2012). Moreover, if the combined
occurrence of AVH and TI marks a critical tipping point in the transition to psychosis
(as noted in section 1.1 above) then it might be important to know much more about
developmental changes in auditory spatial processing in healthy young adults who are,
or are not, at risk for psychosis (Kuhnle et al. 2013). For instance, McKague and
colleagues (McKague et al. 2012) have already shown that healthy young adults
predisposed to hallucinations have no difficulty discriminating between internally and
externally perceived sounds (see also Badcock et al. 2008). A particular strength of this
study was its capacity to examine spatial location independently of speaker identity,
making it a potentially valuable task for future studies of at-risk populations experienc-
ing AVH and TI together.
Models of human auditory functioning have identified a dorsal auditory pathway
which is primarily involved with processing the spatial features of sounds. For exam-
ple, functional neuroimaging provides support for a posterior auditory stream which
encompasses planum temporale (PT), inferior parietal lobe (IPL) and middle frontal
gyrus, which has traditionally been viewed as processing the ‘where’ features of sound
(i.e., spatial localization; Ahveninen et al. 2014; Arnott and Alain 2011; Deouell et al.
2007) – though more recent interpretations also suggest this pathway plays a crucial
role in linking sounds to actions (and the intentions) that generated them (Arnott and
Alain 2011). This latter emphasis provides an obvious point of connection with
previous literature linking first rank symptoms to defective self-monitoring of actions
and intentions in the IPL and related neural circuits (Frith 2012; Frith et al. 2000;
Venkatasubramanian et al. 2011). However, of particular interest here, two recent
studies have provided evidence of structural and functional changes in the dorsal
auditory pathway associated with the experience of AVH in external space
(Looijestijn et al. 2013; Plaze et al. 2011). Looijestijn et al. (2013) found that externally
located voices were associated with an increased neural response in PT and middle
frontal gyrus (though not the IPL) and suggested that internally located AVH may be
distinguished from those experienced in external space by their lack of activation in the
‘where’ pathway. If this interpretation is correct, then a lack of activation in dorsal
auditory pathway might be predicted for TI as well, given their prominent internal
location. However, structural alterations in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) have also
been reported in schizophrenia patients with AVH, leading Plaze and colleagues to
conclude that the spatial location of AVH is associated with right TPJ anatomy – Ba key
region of the ‘where’ auditory pathway^ (Plaze et al. 2011, p. 212). Indeed, it’s been
proposed that Bover-activation of functional modules in the TPJ that subserve social
communication produces the syndrome of schizophrenia^ (Wible 2012, p. 3).
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Equivalent studies of TI are rare, but a single case study of a schizophrenia patient
capable of reporting the exact onset of inserted thoughts showed that the moment of
intrusion was associated with activation in the left supramarginal gyrus (in the dorsal
pathway), whilst persistence of TI was associated with abnormal activation in the
angular gyrus (Kuhn et al. 2010). Consequently, when considering the data together,
an alternative proposal emerges, namely, that the different spatial qualities of AVH and
TI may arise from distinct, but overlapping dysfunctions in the dorsal auditory stream
(see Table 3).
4 Summary and Implications
The evidence presented above suggests that the phenomenological features of both TI
and AVH can be connected to dysfunctional activation of auditory processing streams.
Importantly, within this framework, neither pathway alone is sufficient to understand
the quality of these experiences. Rather, the phenomenological complexity of these
symptoms is related to the combination of activity, at different hierarchical stages,
within each separable auditory stream. Combinatorial accounts of hallucinated voices
have become more common in recent years as a result of the increasing recognition that
single (cognitive or neural) mechanisms alone fail to explain the heterogeneous nature
of the experience (Stephane 2013; Waters et al. 2006). A similar line of thinking has
recently been applied to distinguish inserted thoughts from own thoughts, intrusive
thoughts or communicated thoughts, in terms of a combination of disturbance in control
and identity (referred to as authorship) (Vosgerau and Voss 2014), which resonates with
the neuropsychological approach presented here. In order to test these ideas experi-
mentally, it will be important for future research to directly compare the cognitive and
neural basis of inserted/intrusive thoughts and AVH in patients (e.g., with psychosis or
obsessive compulsive disorder) and non-patient groups. Importantly, if these ideas are
correct they may rule out accounts of AVH and TI as ordinary intrusive thoughts that
have somehow been misattributed (see also Vicente 2014). Furthermore, as Table 3
shows, when viewed within the APS framework, hallucinatory voices can be seen to
capture a broader range of features – and corresponding mechanisms – than inserted
thoughts. Interestingly, this parallels recent conclusions from factor analytic research
(Peralta et al. 2013), and points to a mechanistic basis for the marked difference in
prevalence between these symptoms found in epidemiological surveys. Conversely, the
presence of at least some degree of overlap in dorsal and ventral dysfunction may partly
account for the tendency for AVH and TI to co-occur (Nayani and David 1996; Smeets
et al. 2013).
The APS framework bridges the biology and phenomenology of AVH and TI by
taking advantage of the best available evidence on normal voice perception. It also
complements and extends existing hierarchical predictive coding accounts of psychotic
symptoms (Adams et al. 2013; Fletcher and Frith 2009), by identifying potential stages/
sites of prediction error signals in dorsal and ventral auditory streams. Undoubtedly, the
framework sketched out here is just the beginning. Most notably, the role of identity
and location in AVH and TI was highlighted, but the content (words/thoughts) and
emotions conveyed in these experiences were not addressed. However, the dorsal-
ventral architecture of human perception may offer a more general template for
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understanding hallucinations in other modalities as well as a range of other anomalous
experiences (see Tables 4 and 5).
A number of significant gaps in the literature are worth mentioning, not least of which is
the dearth of empirical studies specifically focused on the nature and experience of inserted
thoughts. In addition, although the phenomenological assessment of AVH is well-served
with a range of detailed assessment tools (Ratcliff et al. 2011) such precision ismissing in the
assessment of TI. A major corollary of the ideas presented in this paper, is that a much more
careful approach to recruitment will be required in future research, in order to match
participants on specific phenomenological characteristics (e.g., to examine whether inserted
and hallucinated voices have the same functional basis). Consequently, the development of
sensitive and standardizedmeasures for the assessment of TI will be central to this endeavor.
Such tools will also be vital to comparing the experience of TI in clinical and non-clinical
populations. If the combined presence of AVH and TI is critical in the emergence of
psychosis (Smeets et al. 2013) then a challenge for the future will be to understand the
developmental trajectory of ventral and auditory pathways in healthy individualswith TI and
AVH who do, and do not, go on to develop psychosis.
There are also a number of limitations in this paper. For example, the focus on
dysfunctional activation within each auditory pathway is informative but fails to
consider the dynamic interactions between dorsal and ventral streams. Importantly,
there is increasing evidence that different kinds of social and environmental adversity
may be associated with different kinds of symptoms (Bentall et al. 2014; Wickham
et al. 2014) but the influence of these factors in the APS framework was not addressed.
Similarly the influence of genetic and molecular mechanisms on symptom develop-
ment and auditory function was not explored (Hugdahl et al. 2015). On the other hand,
situating AVH and TI within a common framework may have significant clinical
implications for treatment of these symptoms. For instance, exploring the different
subjective characteristics of each experience and drawing connections with normal
Table 4 A multi-dimensional approach to self-disturbance based on body perception
Spatial Location (Dorsal) Identity (Ventral)
Self Other
Internal location Perception of body parts Somatic/tactile hallucinations
External location Out-of-body experiences Sensed presence
Table 5 A multi-dimensional approach to self-disturbance based on action perception
Spatial Location (Dorsal) Identity (Ventral)
Self Other
Internal location Perception of biological
motion/action
Delusions of control [by unseen/proximal forces]
Replaced will
External location Delusional influence Delusional sense of being manipulated
[by unseen/ distant forces].
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perceptual processes may provide new insights for people having these experiences and
improve the therapeutic alliance between patient and clinician (Laroi 2006).
Furthermore, a better understanding of the cognitive and neural basis of AVH and TI
may help in the development of common and distinctive treatment strategies - in
keeping with the move towards Bprecision medicine^ in mental health (Insel 2011).
For example, if hallucinated voices and inserted thoughts share a similar disturbance in
executive control then both may benefit from specific treatments targeting this process.
Recent evidence suggests, for instance, that transcranial direct current stimulation could
be useful for modulating the process of reality filtering (Manuel et al. 2014), offering a
potentially new approach to the treatment of both AVH and TI.
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